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Between 2002 and 2008, the Canadian dollar appreciated in real terms against the US 
dollar by 60 percent.  This large change in real exchange rates between such major 
trading partners as Canada and the US is almost unprecedented. This paper explores the 
historical background to the movement of the Canadian dollar during this period, 
discusses the most accepted explanations for the appreciation, and speculates on the 
implications for the Canadian economy.  The discussion is placed within the framework 
of recent developments in the theoretical and empirical literature on exchange rates.  
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1  Introduction 
The Canadian dollar has been one of the most volatile of all world currencies in the past five 
years.  At the beginning of 2002, the dollar was valued at 62 cents in US currency.  At the end 
of 2007, the dollar was at almost exact parity with the US dollar. This represents a 60 percent 
appreciation over a five year period.  Since inflation rates in the US and Canada are almost 
the same, there was an equal movement in the real exchange rate.  In other words, average 
prices of goods and services in Canada increased by 60 percent, relative to those in the US, 
over this time.  This is an unprecedented movement in relative prices for countries that trade 
so much with one another.  In the past few decades, the international system has had large 
variation in exchange rates among major currencies. The fluctuations in the Japanese yen 
relative to the US dollar in the 1980’s were greater than the recent movement in the Canadian 
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dollar. The euro appreciated by about 70 percent against the US dollar between 1999 and 
2007.  But Japan, the US and the euro area are very large economic areas, whose trade 
interdependence with the US, relative to the size of their economies, is relatively small.  By 
contrast, Canada and the US have one of the largest trading relationships of any two countries 
in the world.  The two countries are highly interdependent, with 80 percent of Canadian 
exports going to the US, and 65 percent of its imports coming from the US.   
What accounts for the movement in the Canadian dollar over this time?  How much of the 
currency movement is unique to the US and Canada, and how much is accounted for by a 
world decline in the US dollar? How is the currency appreciation likely to impact on the 
economy?  Is it good or bad for economic activity?  What actions, if any, should the Bank of 
Canada be taking to respond to the currency movement?  Does the volatile dollar hinder the 
vital trading relationship between Canada and the US?  Given that the two currencies are very 
close to parity at present, should the government of Canada consider taking steps to abandon 
currency independence altogether and, in light of the European example, consider a single 
North American currency union based on the US dollar?   
This paper tries to make sense of the recent movements in the Canadian dollar.  We 
address the above questions along a number of dimensions, using as our benchmark the basic 
macroeconomic theory of exchange rates.  The exchange rate is the key relative price 
governing any country’s interaction with the rest of the world.  Yet exchange rates are highly 
variable, influenced by many factors, and are notoriously hard to predict.  Interpreting trends 
in exchange rates is fraught with difficulties. Predicting future movements in exchange rates 
is almost impossible.  But, given the central importance of the exchange rate in international 
trade and financial markets, it is vital to have an understanding of the fundamental forces that 
drive their movements.  If the recent surge in the Canadian dollar can be understood as an 
equilibrium reaction to global forces impacting on the Canadian economy, then the central 
bank and the government should simply let the exchange rate take its course and refrain from 
intervening.  On the other hand, if the dollar is simply a victim of short term speculative 
forces facilitated by volatile financial markets, then the excessive real exchange rate 
movements could impart long term damage to the economy, and countervailing policy may be 
required.   
We begin by discussing the movement of the Canadian dollar over the path of recent 
history.  While the recent surge in the currency is unprecedented, the dollar has experienced 
large swings in its value in the last 50 years, and the recent episode should be interpreted in 
light of this.  We follow this by discussing the usefulness of exchange rate theory, and its 
ability to offer an analytical understanding of recent movements.  While in general, exchange 
rate movements are extremely difficult to predict, and even to rationalize ex-post, the 
Canadian dollar has a more predictable pattern due to its relationship with commodity prices. 
We then offer a detailed analysis of the recent movement of the dollar.  We argue that the size 
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of the recent appreciation has to be decomposed into a global factor, arising from the general 
fall in the US dollar, and a Canada-specific factor, coming from forces impinging directly on 
the Canadian economy.  We then present a discussion of the impacts of the recent rise in the 
dollar on the economy.  How is the strong dollar likely to affect economic growth, inflation, 
and Canadian well-being?  Finally, we discuss the implications of the recent movements in 
the currency for Canadian monetary policy.  
2  The Historical Movements of the Canadian Dollar 
How does the Canadian dollar’s experience of the last few years compare with the historical 
movement of the dollar?  While the recent currency appreciation has indeed been 
unprecedented, we should not lose sight of the fact that the dollar has had very substantial 
fluctuations in value over the past 30 or 40 years.  Figure 1 charts the annual progress of the 
currency since 1949.  Behind the figure lies a fascinating series of separate historical 
episodes.   
 
      Figure 1:  Historical Trajectory of Canadian Dollar Exchange Rate 
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Economics undergraduate students are usually taught about the history of the international 
monetary system beginning from the post WWII period based on a simple narrative.  In the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the Bretton Woods system of international 
currency arrangements required all countries to set fixed exchange rate parities against the US 
dollar.  This then is seen as a long period of fixed exchange rates, which only ended in 1971 
when the US de-linked its currency to gold, and the major industrial countries allowed their 
currencies to freely float.  This is essentially an accurate description of the evolution of 
international monetary arrangements between 1948 and 1971, with one exception.  Canada 
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did not fix its exchange rate during the 1950’s.  In fact, taking an unprecedented and much 
criticized action, Canada floated its currency in 1949, and allowed the value of the dollar to 
be freely determined on foreign exchange markets for the next 11 years.  What led to this 
decision?  The records from the time indicate that there was strong upward pressure on the 
Canadian dollar due to inward capital flows in the late 1940’s1.  To avoid this, the Bank of 
Canada would have had to reduce interest rates, and this raised the danger of increasing 
inflationary pressures.  In this situation, the Bank of Canada decided that floating was the best 
option.   
This intellectual background that supported the Bank’s decision was contained in 
Friedman’s classic defence of flexible exchange rates, which was refined and later published 
in 1953.  His argument goes as follows.  When a country such as Canada receives a 
macroeconomic `shock’ from the outside world (a classic one would be an increase in the 
demand for its export commodities) then adjustment must involve a change in the relative 
price of its exports, or terms of trade.  With a positive shock, requiring the terms of trade must 
improve. One way to achieve this would be to increase the Canadian dollar price of export 
goods.  But this would entail substantial domestic inflation, and if prices are slow to adjust, 
may lead to overheating in the domestic economy.  An alternative mechanism for achieving 
terms of trade appreciation would be for the country’s currency to increase in value. Since 
this does not involve any change in domestic prices, it is not inflationary, and causes less 
internal disruption in goods and factor markets. Friedman’s analogy was daylight savings 
time.  It is better to move all clocks forward by an hour in spring, rather than requiring each 
household to individually adjust their daily routines up by an hour.  This is the equivalent of 
moving the country’s real export price by changing the exchange rate, rather than letting 
individual prices setters adjust Canadian dollar price of all export goods.  In this sense, the 
exchange rate plays a vital role in the adjustment process after an economy is hit by external 
shocks. It acts as a way to facilitate relative price adjustment in a smooth and painless 
fashion.  
If all movements in the historical US-Canadian exchange rate could be simply 
decomposed into the response to measured fundamental shocks, then Friedman’s analogy 
would be perfect, and would represent a strong case for allowing the exchange rate to adjust 
freely without policy intervention.  As we see below however, the actual experience of the 
Canadian dollar has been a lot more complicated. 
Figure 1 illustrates the bilateral US Canada rate from 1948 to 2007, expressed in terms of 
the popular convention; US dollars per Canadian dollar.  The first thing to note is that there 
has been a lot of variation in the currency over this long period, much of it involving a 
weakening dollar.  But surprisingly, we have ended up almost exactly where we started – with 
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the Canadian and US dollar very close to parity.  We will later discuss one of the central 
theories of exchange rates – the `Purchasing Power Parity’ (PPP) theory, and we will see that, 
in the long run, this theory has some quite well supported predictions2.  
The movement of the Canadian dollar since the WWII is a story in seven chapters.  The 
first chapter comprises the 1950’s, during which the dollar floated against the US dollar, as 
discussed above.  During the 1950’s the Canadian dollar was quite strong – above parity most 
of the time. It peaked in July 1957 at 1.06 US.  But at the end of the decade, the Canadian 
economy slowed,  as the long resource-driven investment boom of the 1950’s abated, and the 
currency weakened.  The Canadian experiment with floating ended in 1962 when the Bank of 
Canada re-entered Bretton Woods, the international fixed parity agreement, at a value of 92.5 
US cents.  During the rest of the 1960’s, the currency was pegged at this rate. But the 
multilateral currency stability that Bretton Woods had brought to the international monetary 
system was fast dwindling as the 1960’s progressed.  There was a widespread erosion of 
confidence in the fixed peg between the US dollar and gold, the lynchpin of the Bretton 
Woods system.  Inflation was becoming a worldwide concern, and European governments 
believed that the Bretton Woods system `exported’ US inflation to Europe. In Canada, the fall 
in US dollar confidence was putting upward pressure on the currency, requiring the Bank of 
Canada to continually intervene in order to prevent appreciation.  In 1970, the Canadian 
dollar was again allowed to float freely, and has done so ever since (by 1973, most other 
major countries were also floating against one another).  The seventies, the third of our 
chapters of the trajectory for the Canadian dollar, were not unlike the very recent experience.  
World oil prices surged upwards after 1973, and the Canadian economy outperformed the US, 
at least for the early part of the decade.  The Canadian dollar was strong – at or above parity 
up to 1976.  But after the Quebec election of 1976, with increased political uncertainty, there 
was a sharp drop in the currency.  This begins the fourth chapter in the dollar’s history – a 
long, gradual weakening between 1976 and 1985.  During the first half of the 1980’s, the 
dollar lost 13 cents against the US dollar, bottoming out at 71 cents in late 1985.  This episode 
coincided with Ronald Reagan’s first term in office, in which the US dollar surged against all 
world currencies.  The early 1980’s US dollar bubble ended in late 1985 after the famous 
`Plaza Agreement’, in which the major world countries pledged to work towards a weaker US 
dollar and a reduction of the US current account deficit.   Following this, the Canadian dollar 
began a slow but vigorous period of strengthening.   This fifth chapter in the progress of the 
currency shows the typical rollercoaster pattern that is seen in earlier episodes. The currency 
appreciated slowly but persistently, peaking at 89 cents US in November 1991.  This strong 
dollar period is quite a controversial part of recent Canadian policy history – it coincided with 
                                                 
2 PPP’s implications are for the real exchange rate.  But because Canadian and US inflation experience 
has been so close, Figure 1 would look very similar if we used the real rather than the nominal 
exchange rate. 
Review of Economic Analysis 1 (2009) 1-33  
 6
the beginning of Canadian `inflation targeting’.  The Bank of Canada raised interest rates 
significantly and announced that it would thereafter follow a policy towards a significantly 
low and stable rate of inflation.  The policy achieved considerable success in reducing 
Canadian inflation, but at least in the short term, the real economy performed very poorly.  
Canada slipped into a recession in 1990; this was a `made in Canada’ recession, since the US 
and other countries were still growing.  
From 1992 onwards, the economy began to recover slowly, and the dollar started again on 
a long slow period of weakening.  The currency was subject to multiple influences during this 
time; fiscal and political uncertainty during the mid 1990s, followed by global shocks and the 
series of world financial crises in the late 1990s.   The lingering effects of the 1990-1991 
recession, the Federal and Provincial budget deficit problems, and the Quebec referendum of 
1995, lead to a progressive weakening of the currency up to the late 1990’s.  These effects  
had been staunched considerably by 1997, but then the international system was hit by the 
Asian financial crisis.  Sudden collapse in Asian currencies and cutoff of capital flows to their 
economies led to a fall in world commodity prices, representing a big negative shock to the 
Canadian dollar. The overall picture from 1991 to 2002 shows a tremendous weakening of the 
currency, falling from 89 cents US in 1991 to an all time low of 61 cents US in 2002.  At this 
time, which is really not very long ago, we began to hear talk of the `long term decline’ of the 
Canadian dollar.  Newspaper reports and some economists began to speculate on the benefits 
of adopting the US currency.   
But the long term decline of the Canadian dollar turned out to be itself illusory.  In fact, as 
we will argue later, there were very good reasons to believe that the dollar was greatly 
undervalued in 2002.  Moreover, for different reasons, there were strong reasons to predict a 
more general fall in the US dollar.  This opens up our seventh and final chapter in the story of 
the Canadian dollar; - the dramatic appreciation of 2002 to 2007.  In terms of drama, this 
clearly outshines any of our earlier episodes, for it contains the loonies lowest value in 
history, on January 21, 2002, at 61.79 US cents, and also its highest point in history, on 
November 7, 2007, a mere five years later, at 1.103 US cents, representing a 79 percent 
increase in value.  It is this period that we will examine in much greater detail below.  
3  Exchange Rate Theory 
The exchange rate matters only in so far as it influences relative prices of goods and assets 
across countries.  One key relative price is the real exchange rate. This is the price-adjusted 
value of the nominal exchange rate.  The theory of purchasing power parity says that the real 
exchange rate should be constant, and equal to unity.  Purchasing power parity says that the 
exchange rate should move to a level such that the price of a basket of goods in one country is 
equal to that of its trading partners.  Another way to say this is that movements in exchange 
rates should reflect differential inflation rates across countries.  
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Purchasing power parity theory has almost zero explanatory power for understanding 
exchange rates at high frequency.  Figure 2 illustrates the real and nominal exchange rate for 
Canada from 1980 until the present.  In addition, the Figure illustrates the ratio of price levels 
between the US and Canada.  If PPP held, then the nominal exchange rate (blue line) should 
move exactly in line with the relative price level (green line).   We see clearly that this is not 
the case.  The nominal and real exchange rate move in tandem, and there is hardly any 
correlation between the nominal exchange rate and relative prices.  When we compare the US 
and Canada, two countries with low and stable inflation rates, we find that relative price 
levels move only very, very slowly.  In this Figure, Canada had a worse inflation performance 
than the US for most of the 1980’s, so that US price level fell gradually relative to Canada.  
This was turned around after 1990 when Canada switched to an inflation targeting monetary 
policy, so the Canadian inflation rate fell below that of the US.  But even allowing for these 
differences in inflation performance, we see the relative national price levels have moved 
little, and when they move do so very slowly.  By contrast, nominal and real exchange rates 
are highly volatile, and move quickly.   
 
       Figure 2:  Nominal and Real Exchange Rates 
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There is nothing very surprising in this.  If PPP was true, then no-one would discuss the 
exchange rate, since it would really only be a way of converting between currencies, but it 
would not affect economic decision making.  Nevertheless, PPP is a useful concept, because 
there is some evidence that it does tend to hold in the long run, even though it clearly doesn’t 
hold in the short run.  In the long run, if the exchange rate moves very far away from PPP, it 
tends to move back to its PPP level, although the time it takes for this reversion is hard to 
predict.  Figure 3 illustrates this by introducing two definitions of the Canadian exchange rate.  
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The first is the `theoretical’ exchange rate that would ensure PPP.  This is measured and 
published by the OECD at annual frequencies. The chart indicates that the theoretical 
exchange rate, or PPP, started in 1980 at 86.5 US cents, and fell gradually to 83 cents in 2006.  
By contrast, the actual exchange rate was much more volatile, as we have already discussed in 
Figure 1.  But nevertheless, it seems apparent from the Figure that the actual exchange rate 
has a tendency to return to PPP over time.  Right now, it is clear that the Canadian dollar is 
above its PPP rate.  Based on this chart, we may speculate that the future of the dollar 
suggests a fall.   
 
          Figure 3:  PPP Exchange Rate and Actual Exchange Rate 
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But PPP is a weak theory of the exchange rate, and holds only in the very long run at best.  
There are strong economic reasons for PPP not to hold in the short run.  PPP is based loosely 
on the idea that open economies must have very similar prices of goods, when evaluated in a 
common currency. If this did not hold, the argument goes, then competition would drive the 
prices toward equality.  But we know that this type of ideal competition does not apply in 
practice.  First, many goods are not in fact traded across countries – and so there is no clear 
reason for their prices to be equalized.  A classic example is haircuts.  It is not clear what 
competitive forces would be set in motion by having haircuts in Calgary more expensive than 
those in Denver, when evaluated in Canadian dollars.  But this same attribute applies to many 
goods and services produced in both the US and Canada.  What this means is that the real 
exchange rate may move away from PPP over time for good economic reasons.  
PPP is not really a theory of exchange rates so much as a simple (and unrealistic) 
restriction on the relationship between the nominal exchange rates and prices.  Once we 
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realize that a complete theory of exchange rates must encompass the determination of the real 
exchange rate, then we must acknowledge the fact that there is no simple one-directional 
model of exchange rate determination – the exchange rate is determined by a whole host of 
macroeconomic influences simultaneously with other macro variables such as interest rates, 
stock prices, consumption, investment and GDP.  The exchange rate is determined in a 
general equilibrium environment, in combination with other major macroeconomic variables.   
This general equilibrium perspective on exchange rate and macroeconomic equilibrium 
lies behind the structural models that are used at the Bank of Canada and most other modern 
Central Banks in the world today.  The underlying logic of these models  extends the 
traditional `Mundell-Fleming’ model into a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
environment, where the economy is subjected to internal and external shocks, in an 
environment of free international financial flows.   
In the modern DSGE environment, the exchange rate is seen as a key part of the overall 
macroeconomic adjustment mechanism.  Take for instance, an open economy that is hit by a 
negative shock to world demand for its goods.  This will reduce the trade surplus, and lead to 
a compensating exchange rate depreciation.  The exchange rate acts so as to `cushion’ the 
economy from the full impacts of the economic shock, since the depreciation in itself helps to 
stimulate net exports and partially offset the initial rise in aggregate demand.   
A key feature of this model is that the exchange rate is not an exogenous force in itself, but 
is determined endogenously as part of overall macroeconomic equilibrium.  Usually, in the 
long run, these models predict that the real exchange rate is consistent with PPP, in the short 
and medium run, the exchange rate is part of the overall macro adjustment process.  In fact 
the role of the exchange rate in the macroeconomic adjustment process is an important 
element of the overall Canadian monetary policy agenda, as discussed below.  
The basic theory behind such models has been developed and extensively revised over the 
last couple of decades.  How is the theory supported empirically? Here, we find relatively 
discouraging news.  Economists studying exchange rates have long come to grips with the 
findings that, while in the long run, the trend path of exchange rates are approximately 
consistent with economic theory, the behaviour of the exchange rate in the short to medium 
run is much more difficult to explain, statistically.  The key problem is that, like stock prices, 
the exchange rate is an asset price.  It is determined in financial markets, and financial 
markets tend to produce highly volatile prices.  While over the medium to long run, we can 
understand the movement of the exchange rate using underlying economic theory, in the short 
run, the exchange rate is highly unpredictable.   
These findings have been known for many years.  Meese and Rogoff  (1983), using only 
ten years of data on floating exchange rates among major currencies, found that no structural 
model of the exchange rate could statistically forecast exchange rate movements better than a 
random walk model.  Given that the random walk model predicts that the future exchange rate 
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is the same as the current exchange rate, this was taken as a general failure of economic 
models of exchange rates.  A large subsequent literature has not much succeeded in reversing 
these findings.  While studies have shown that at longer horizons, exchange rate models do 
forecast better than a random walk (e.g. Mark, 1995), it has remained very difficult to obtain 
strong empirical support for structural exchange rate models at the 1-2 year horizon.   
Recent authors have argued however that the unpredictability of exchange rates cannot be 
necessarily be interpreted as a failure of exchange rate theory.  As we have noted, the 
exchange rate is an asset price.  As such, it will be influenced not just by current 
fundamentals, such as monetary policy, productivity, etc, but also by the expectation of future 
fundamentals.  The exchange rate will move in response to changes in the economy’s forecast 
for future fundamentals.  In most models of asset pricing, it is likely that the weight placed on 
expected future fundamentals is substantially greater than that on current fundamentals.  In an 
important recent paper, Engel, West and Mark (2008) show that as the weight on future 
expected fundamentals rises, the behaviour of the exchange rate should theoretically approach 
that of a random walk process.  That is, even if fundamentals are predictable, and the 
exchange rate is determined by fundamentals,  the exchange rate itself may be unpredictable.  
In essence, a random walk process for the exchange rate may be fully consistent with efficient 
financial markets where expectations of future fundamentals are of critical importance.  
One key property of theoretical models of exchange rates is that the exchange rate plays 
the role of an asset price.  That is, the exchange rate is the relative price of currencies, and as 
such should be determined in financial markets.  Prices in financial markets are forward 
looking, and should reflect information about both current and expected future values of all 
`fundamentals’.  Engel West and Mark (2008) show that this implies that exchange rates 
should contain some predictability for future fundamentals.  That is, movements in exchange 
rates should be able to forecast movements in future fundamentals.  Here, they find some 
success.  Even though the exchange rate behaves as a random walk in the data, innovations in 
exchange rates contain some predictive power for standard fundamentals such as GDP and 
money supplies.  
It is not surprising that financial markets have a large role to play in the movements of the 
exchange rate.  Traditional theories of the exchange rate are based around the role of trade 
flows;  imports and exports of goods and services, in balance of payments and exchange rate 
determination.  But the volume of international financial flows across national borders is 
almost a hundred times larger than trade flows.  The Bank for International Settlements 
calculates the average daily volume of foreign exchange transactions at three year intervals.  
The past decade has shown explosive growth in foreign exchange trading volume.  The most 
recent report estimated that the average daily world foreign exchange trading for April, 2007 
was is 3.2 trillion US dollars, or an annual volume of 832 trillion, based on a 250 day year for 
financial markets. By contrast, the total volume of world trade for all of 2006 was 
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approximately 12 trillion dollars.  This represents only 1.4 percent of the annual world foreign 
exchange trading volume! Hence, it may not be surprising that at short horizons, movements 
in exchange rates seem quite disconnected from the real economy.  
It is not just the direction of movements in the exchange rate that is hard to explain based 
on economic theory, but also the magnitude.  The recent surge in the Canadian dollar 
represents a huge relative price change, applied to a whole economy.  But movements in real 
exchange rates of this magnitude are not uncommon – in fact they are the norm.  If we look at 
all OECD economies which exhibit a range of very different macroeconomic characteristics 
we find that the volatility of the real exchange rate is greater than that of GDP.  In some cases, 
such as Japan, real effective exchange rate volatility is 5 times that of GDP.   
It is tempting to conclude from this that exchange rates are excessively volatile, and that 
this excess volatility must have economic costs. Many writers have argued that exchange rate 
volatility must reduce international trade.  The euro area was developed partly on the 
argument that stable real exchange rates were an essential ingredient in fostering trade flows 
within the EU.  But, surprisingly, evidence for the costs of exchange rate volatility is very 
hard to obtain.  It is not true that countries with more volatile real exchange rates have smaller 
trade volume than countries with stable exchange rates.  Japan is a key example of a large 
open economy with very high real exchange rate volatility, but with a spectacularly successful 
export sector.  The problem in developing the argument that exchange rate volatility is costly 
for international trade is that the exchange rate is not an exogenous price in itself, but is 
determined endogenously.  Movements in exchange rates that represent responses to internal 
or external shocks may just as easily enhance international trade rather than detract from it.   
There is a further sense in which exchange rate volatility is disconnected from the real 
economy.  Popular discussion tends to imply that exchange rate movements are quickly 
passed through to imported goods prices.  Thus, an appreciation should be reflected in lower 
prices of imported goods, and a depreciation should increase the price of imports.  This 
relative price mechanism is central to the standard textbook model of exchange rate 
movements.  But in fact, evidence for many countries has established that the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through into goods prices is very limited.  Even for a small and open 
economy like Canada, the correlation between exchange rate changes and goods prices facing 
consumers is very low.  As we will see below, very large fluctuations in exchange rates may 
have relatively minor changes in the price structure of traded goods that consumers actually 
face.    
Most of the research on exchange rate economics has focused on the exchange rates of 
large country currencies, such as the US dollar, the Japanese yen, or the euro (and previously 
the German d-mark and other pre-euro European currencies).  As discussed above, it has 
proven quite difficult to develop robust models which satisfactorily explain the behaviour of 
these exchange rates, at least at high frequencies.  For these currencies, exchange rates seem 
Review of Economic Analysis 1 (2009) 1-33  
 12
disconnected from fundamentals.  But there is another group of countries for which 
movements in exchange rates are some better explained.  These are countries with a large 
share of resources or primary commodities in their exports.  Among OECD economies, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway are examples of these currencies.  For these 
currencies, the data show that a substantial fraction of exchange rate volatility is linked to 
movements in commodity prices.  These are called `commodity currencies’, for obvious 
reasons. 
Figure 4 illustrates this phenomenon for Canada.  Figure 4 shows the real effective 
exchange rate, alongside the `traditional fundamentals’ which appear as principle 
determinants of exchange rates in the basic theoretical models.  In particular, the Figure 
includes a) movements in relative Canadian-to US GDP, and b) movements in the Canada-US 
interest rate differential.  It is apparent from the Figure that there is little correlation between 
the real exchange rate and these measures of traditional exchange rate fundamentals. This is 
not surprising, given our discussion on the lack of empirical support for traditional exchange 
rate models. But for the commodity currencies, there is a much more robust relationship 
between commodity prices and exchange rates.  Figure 5 shows the relationship between two 
measures of commodity prices and the real effective exchange rate. One index measures 
commodity prices generally, and the other index contains commodity prices excluding energy 
prices.  It is clear that, for both indices, there is a correlation between commodity prices and 
real exchange rates. It is not a perfect relationship, but in general, the Figures imply that a rise 
in commodity prices is generally associated with a real effective exchange rate appreciation.  
In fact, the relationship seems to have become tighter over the past two years. The rise of the 
Canadian dollar since 2002 is quite closely tied with the run-up in commodity prices.  
   
         Figure 4:  Canadian Dollar and Traditional Fundamentals, 1980Q1=100 
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This relationship between commodity prices and exchange rates for a number of 
commodity exporters has been established more formally in the empirical literature on 
exchange rates (e.g. Amano and Van Norden, 1993, Chen and Rogoff 2003). Indeed, 
commodity prices form a central part of the understanding of the recent dollar movements.  
The Bank of Canada maintains a forecasting model for the dollar in which this link acts as a 
key mechanism driving the real exchange rate (Murray 2007).  To the extent that commodity 
prices drive the real exchange rate, the Bank can use the estimated relationship to assess the 
degree to which the Canadian dollar may be `undervalued’ or `overvalued’.  We will discuss 
the Bank’s exchange rate model further in the next section.  
 
Figure 5:  Canadian Dollar and Commodity Prices, 1980Q1=100 
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  Source: Cansim, IFS 
4  The Canadian Dollar 2002-2008 
In this section we provide an analysis of the recent movement in the Canadian dollar, from the 
perspective of the theoretical models of exchange rates discussed in the previous section.  We 
argue that an adequate discussion of this episode must allow for two quite separate influences 
over the exchange rate.  The first reflects the general multilateral decline of the US dollar, 
which can be accounted for mainly by US specific forces, quite independent of Canadian 
events.  The second group of factors represents Canada specific events, relating to the 
strength of the Canadian economy, the Canadian fiscal position, and most importantly 
Canada’s position as a net commodity exporter in a time of a worldwide commodity boom.  
To get some sense of how important each of these two factors is in the movement of the 
bilateral Canada US exchange rate, we focus on Figure 6. This describes the fall of the US 
dollar relative to all world currencies (the real effective exchange rate), and the fall in the 
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bilateral US dollar exchange rate against the Canadian dollar.  Measured in this way, the US 
real effective exchange rate fell by 17 percent, while the bilateral real exchange rate against 
the Canadian dollar fell by 30 percent.  Hence, in this simple accounting exercise, just over 
half the movement in the Canadian dollar may be attributed to global factors influencing the 
US dollar, and half to Canada-specific factors.  We discuss these two factors in turn.  
 
Figure 6:  How Much of the Rise in the Dollar is Canada Specific? 1980Q1=100 
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 Source: IFS 
Global Influences on the US dollar 
It has been apparent to most observers for some time that the US dollar was likely to 
experience a considerable real effective depreciation.  The principle force behind this is the 
size and persistence of the US current account deficit.  The US has experienced a current 
account deficit for the last 15 years, but the deficit, measured relative to GDP – (see Figure 
7), was quite manageable up until 2000.  After this however, the current account deficit began 
to rise rapidly, reaching 6.5 percent of GDP in 2006. There has been a debate on the causes of 
the current account deficit.  On the one hand, the proximate cause can be seen as a fall in the 
US saving rate from the mid-1990’s onwards.  But the counterpart of the US current account 
deficit is a current account surplus in the rest of the world.  Since the euro area has had an 
approximate current account balance, essentially all of this surplus has come from emerging 
market economies, mostly Asian economies, and  more recently, the oil exporting economies.  
In East Asian economies, investment rates fell substantially after the Asian crisis of the late 
1990’s, leading to increase trade surpluses. In China, for many reasons, there has been a 
significant increase in savings rates, and savings has also increased substantially in the oil 
exporting countries as consumption has not caught up with the increased windfall income 
from the run-up in oil prices.  
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Figure 7:  The US Current Account as % of GDP 
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    Source: BEA 
 
Traditional economic theory would predict capital flows from wealthy advanced 
economies to poor growing economies.  The recent experience has been the exact opposite of 
this. Can such as situation be efficient, and sustainable?  One perspective sees the US deficit 
as being driven by inefficiently low US savings, which must be reversed in order to maintain 
a sustainable external debt position.  Another view sees the central cause as an excess of 
savings in emerging market economies and oil exporters.  In addition, it is argued that many 
of these economies have an absence of stable, safe investment prospects, and prefer the 
relative safety of US assets.   
Whatever the cause of global imbalances, the consensus view among economists is that 
US current account deficits of over 6 percent of GDP are unsustainable, since it must result in 
a rapid buildup in US net foreign debt – estimates based on projected growth of the US lead 
to net debt to GDP ratios of over 100 percent.  This would not only place an unacceptable 
burden on the US economy in order to service this debt, but runs the risk of a collapse in 
international confidence in US assets and a sudden cutoff of the US from an ability to borrow 
on international markets.  
If the US deficit is to fall, then almost any economic model would predict that a real 
depreciation of the US dollar is required.  Traditional net export driven models of the current 
account would argue this based on the necessity of increasing export competitiveness and 
reducing total imports.  But even from a more macro savings-investment viewpoint, a 
turnaround in the current account should require a shifting of resources out of non-traded 
goods and into the traded goods sector, and a fall in overall expenditure relative to income for 
the US economy.  This reallocation in expenditure would inevitably generate a real exchange 
rate depreciation.   
There have been a variety of estimates of the extent of the real depreciation in the US 
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dollar that would be associated with a current account stabilization.  Obstfeld and Rogoff  
(2005) argued that a current account rebalancing would be associated with a thirty percent 
real depreciation of the US dollar.  At the time, this was seen as excessively alarmist.  Many 
economists argued that adjustment could be effected with a much smaller change in exchange 
rates.  But as we’ve seen, the Obstfeld and Rogoff number was not an overestimate, as the fall 
in the real exchange rate from the peak in 2002 has in fact been approximately 30 percent.  
Has the fall in the dollar helped to turn around the US current account?  Figure 7 shows 
that in fact the current account deficit has started to diminish, starting in late 2006.  But it 
remains at a much higher level than is thought to be sustainable.  There are a number of 
reasons that the impact on the current account has been small.  First, there is a natural delay 
between movements in real exchange rates and movements in the trade balance.  Economists 
have christened this the `J-curve effect’, suggesting that a real depreciation may initially be 
associated with an amplification of a current account deficit before the deficit shrinks and 
moves toward surplus.   
Aside from this conventional effect however, there are two specific issues related to the 
US situation which may explain why the turnaround in the current account has been so slow 
and muted. The first is that the US dollar has experienced significant real depreciation, it has 
not depreciated against many of the countries against which it experiencing large current 
account deficits.  This is particularly true of the US China case.  China followed a pegged 
nominal exchange rate against the US dollar until late 2006, and since then has allowed for 
some nominal appreciation, but much less than might be expected if the Renminbi was freely 
floating.  At the same time, the Chinese overall current account surplus has grown 
tremendously in the last 3 years, and was approaching 12 percent of GDP for 2007.  The real 
appreciation of the Renminbi against the US dollar has been far less than the overall real 
effective depreciation of the dollar.  Most of the US dollar adjustment has taken place against 
the euro, the UK pound, the Canadian dollar, and the Australian dollar.  But these are not 
countries with an unusually large trade surplus with the US.  Hence, the `right’ form of 
exchange rate adjustment has not been experienced, and at the same time, it has been argued 
that the freely floating currencies have had to endure excessive appreciation of their 
currencies against the dollar.  According to this `spillover theory’, the rise of the Canadian 
dollar (as well as the euro and the UK pound) has been excessive, precisely because the truly 
undervalued currencies, such as the Renminbi, have been kept fixed.  
Another non-standard potential explanation for the lack of response of the US trade 
balance to the real depreciation lies in the direct impact of currency movements on net foreign 
assets.  For the US, almost all the US gross liabilities are denominated in US dollars – for 
instance, a lot of US dollar treasury bills are held as official reserve assets by foreign central 
banks.  On the other hand, most US gross assets are denominated in euro and other non-dollar 
currencies.  An example is FDI and portfolio equity assets held in Europe and other areas.  As 
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first noted by Tille (2005), this means that an unanticipated nominal depreciation of the US 
dollar automatically  reduces the net external debt of the US, since it increases the dollar 
value of gross assets relative to gross liabilities.  Take for instance, the situation where the US 
has all its assets in euro, equal to about 60 percent of GDP (approximately the case 
empirically), while it has all its liabilities in dollars, approximately 90 percent of GDP, 
leading to a thirty percent of GDP net foreign debt.  For a given nominal GDP, a nominal 
depreciation of 10 percent will raise the value of assets to 66 percent of GDP, reducing the 
size of net foreign liabilities to 24 percent of GDP.   The upshot is that, for given external 
asset and liability composition, pure valuation effects can achieve substantial adjustment in 
the US net external position, without any corresponding movement in the trade balance.  This 
idea has been pursued at length in Gourinchas and Rey (2007). 
Canada-Specific Influences on the Canada-US Exchange Rate 
While there have undoubtedly been substantial global pressures on the US dollar, there have 
also been clear forces specific to Canada leading to pressure for an appreciating currency.  As 
we saw in section 1, the Canadian dollar was deeply undervalued in 2002, on a purchasing 
power parity basis.  Based on this consideration alone, one might have predicted a 
strengthening of the currency.  Of course we acknowledged that PPP is a very weak and 
imperfect benchmark on which to predict currency movements.  But all the other macro-
economic factors that should influence real exchange rates also led to the conclusion that the 
Canadian dollar would appreciate.  In particular, Canada had a very strong trade and current 
account surplus – exports had been booming since the late 1990’s.  In general a trade surplus 
should be associated with an appreciating real exchange rate.  Also, as a result of the fiscal 
stabilization of the mid 1990’s, Canada had a unique position in terms of the government 
budget.  In contrast to the US, and most other OECD economies, Canada was in a robust 
structural fiscal surplus. With the recession of 2001, many countries had seen their fiscal 
positions weaken considerably. Hence, all the usual indicators pointed to an improvement in 
the currency. But what was not foreseen at all is the extent of the increase in the dollar’s 
value.  Most forecasters at in 2003 and 2004 were predicting a rise in the loonie to the mid 80 
cents US.  As we’ve seen, this is approximately the PPP level.  But we know that the 
exchange rate surged past this prediction at the end of 2005, was up close to 90 cents by end 
2006, and then broke through parity by late 2007.   
What accounts for the magnitude of the appreciation of the dollar?  The clear culprit is the 
world price of oil.  In fact, using the Bank of Canada exchange rate equation, this statement 
can be supported quantitatively. But before we do this, it is instructive to look at some trends 
in Canada’s export patterns.  Figure 8 decomposes Canadian exports into different product 
categories, expressed as a share of total exports.  First, two of the major traditional export 
sectors; machinery and equipment, and auto products, have been losing export share since the 
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late 1990’s.  Indeed, autos have been cut almost in half, as a share of exports. Secondly, the 
share of forestry products has been falling sharply since the same time.  But the most dramatic 
piece of the figure is the spectacular rise in the share of energy products in total exports. From 
1999 to 2007 the share of energy in exports almost triples – going from 7 percent to 20 
percent.  In fact, the growth from 2002-2007 is almost the same magnitude. Hence, it is clear 
that energy, and especially oil, has become much more important, and this has come at the 
expense of some traditional export sectors.  It is thus not surprising that the Canadian dollar 
has become more sensitive to oil prices.  In fact, as noted in (Maeir and De Pratto 2007), the 
correlation between the dollar and energy prices has increased significantly since 2002, a fact 
suggested also by Figure 5  Hence, to a great extent, the rise of the dollar over the last 5 years 
can be tied to the price of oil.. This also comes out in the latest simulations of the Bank of 
Canada’s exchange rate equation, which relies heavily on commodity and energy prices in its 
tracking ability.   
     Figure 8:  Share in Canadian Exports 
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   Source: Cansim 
 
It is important to note however, that this type of reasoning, based on simulations of 
estimated equations, is a statistical definition alone.  In the absence of a clear analytical 
modeling background (which we don’t have), it is really not possible to be precise about the 
degree to which the currency is undervalued or overvalued.  In fact, there is always a sense in 
which, if we are attempting to interpret the time path of asset prices, such as exchange rates, 
then it is very difficult to separate expectations from fundamentals.  An example is given in 
Bachetta and Van Wincoop (2004).  They explore a model in which exchange rates are 
determined by trading activities of a large group of differentially informed market 
participants.  In this case, agents must attempt to predict not just the market fundamentals, but 
also the expectations of others.  In this case, it can transpire that traders may end up focusing 
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on a single public signal (such as the price of oil), because they correctly believe that other 
traders will form their expectations based on this same signal, even though this signal may 
have little or no fundamental structural relationship with the value of the asset itself.  
Essentially, in the environment of differentially informed traders, were agents are attempting 
a forecast of the forecast of others, beliefs can take on a life of their own.  Thus, it is possible 
that the Canadian dollar becomes an oil currency in recent financial markets just because 
most foreign exchange traders are focusing on the price of oil in the decisions about buying or 
selling the dollar.  That financial markets have a large role to play, at least in the short term 
volatility of the currency, is quite clear.  The evidence, discussed in the previous section, and 
to which we return in the following section, is that financial markets tend to give rise to 
exchange rate overshooting.  Thus, it is not necessarily legitimate to conclude that the linkage 
from oil price movements to the exchange rate supports the view that the movement of the 
exchange rate is efficient.  
5  The Exchange Rate and the Economy   
What impact will the recent real exchange rate appreciation have on the Canadian economy?  
In the popular press, there is a range of viewpoints.  On the one hand, consumers may benefit 
from the opportunity for lucrative cross-border shopping.  But exporters, especially those in 
the manufacturing sector, may find their profitability drastically eroded by the fall in the value 
of the US dollar.  At the same time, manufacturers may find it profitable to engage in 
upgrading machinery and equipment at lower import costs, thereby improving productivity.  
Clearly, the impact of currency movements on the real economy is complicated and multi-
dimensional.  But it should always be kept in mind that the analysis of the link between the 
exchange rate and the economy cannot be done in a coherent way without an understanding of 
what drives the exchange rate itself.  The exchange rate is not moving in a vacuum, but is 
responding in response to the underlying economic environment.  
In this section we present a number of perspectives on how the exchange rate interacts 
with the behaviour of the real economy, and assess how the recent movements in the 
exchange rate may be interpreted.  We begin by comparing the recent appreciation with the 
experience of 1990-1992, another era in which the currency experienced dramatic 
appreciation. As economists will recall, this also presaged a recession in Canada, followed by 
a period of low growth and very poor economic performance.  Can we rule out a similar 
outcome this time?   
Will the Dollar Hurt the Economy?  
The recent media coverage of the strength of the dollar has been dominated by the prospect of 
job losses and the erosion of competitiveness in the export sector. Without doubt, the nature 
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of a flexible exchange rate implies that certain sectors will be hurt by exchange rate 
adjustment.  But the more pertinent question is whether the movement in the currency itself is 
a negative shock to the overall economy.  To throw light on this question, we compare two 
episodes of major currency appreciation.  The first dates back to the late 1980s and early 
1990’s.  The Canadian dollar was extremely weak, relative to the US dollar in the mid 1980’s, 
falling to its then lowest point in history of 69 cents US in February 1986.  But five years 
later, the dollar had risen to 89 US cents.  But the difference then, relative to now, is that the 
dollar reached a peak at a time when the Canadian economy was going into a sharp recession, 
which was prolonged for much of the early 1990’s.  Figures 9 and 10 compare the experience 
of 1988-1993 with that of 2002-2007.  In both cases, the Canadian dollar was rising strongly 
over a period of years.  But there were significant differences in the rest of the economy.  In 
the earlier period, the trade balance was negative, and economy was barely growing.  In the 
later period, there were large and continued trade surpluses, and robust growth rates.  Why 
was the dollar rising in both periods?  As we’ve seen in the discussion in the last section, 
commodity prices have played a large role in the recent movement in the currency.  By 
contrast, in 1988-1992, commodity prices were flat, and actually fell from 1990 onwards.  But 
the currency kept rising until late 1991.  How can we account for the sharp appreciation of 
1988-91, when the situation seemed so different relative to the recent episode?  
The key difference seems to be related to the stance of monetary policy.  In 1990-1991, the 
Bank of Canada followed a very tight monetary policy, as part of the inception of their 
inflation targeting policy.  During 1990s, the Bank of Canada rate was 4.5 percentage points 
higher, on average, than the US Federal Funds rate.  By contrast, in the last five years, there 
was almost no difference in the Canadian and US short term interest rates, as shown in Figure 
10.  On the surface, the strong currency in the early 1990’s seems to be attributable to a very 
restrictive monetary policy, while the recent appreciation is more an episode of strong 
economic growth and high commodity prices.  In the earlier period, as we would expect from 
a restrictive monetary policy, the appreciation was associated with a weak trade balance and 
slow growth, while in the later period, the booming economy itself drove the appreciation.  In 
both episodes, we had an appreciating currency.  But in the first, the currency rose because of 
high interest rates, which slowed the economy.  In the second case, the combination of strong 
domestic demand and rising commodity prices stimulated economic growth and the value of 
the dollar at the same time. This helps to make the point that not all currency appreciations 
are alike3.   
                                                 
3 It should be noted also that the fiscal situation in the late 1980’s was quite different from the recent 
past.  The Federal and Provincial governments had large budget deficits, and there was widespread 
concern about uncontrolled growth in government spending and debt.  At least part of the interest rate 
differential between Canada and the US might be attributed to a `fiscal risk premium’.   
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Figure 9:   Exchange Rate and the Economy, 1988-1993 
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   Source: Cansim, IFS. The unemployment rate has been scaled to fit in the figure. 
 
 
Figure 10:  The Exchange Rate and the Economy: 2002-2007 
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   Source: Cansim, IFS. The unemployment rate has been scaled to fit in the figure. 
Dutch Disease Effects 
This is not to say that the present strong dollar is without problems.  A real appreciation that 
is driven by domestic demand and commodity prices will inevitably have negative spillovers 
on traditional export sectors.  This is clearly showing up in manufacturing export data, as 
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we’ve seen in the previous section.  At the time of writing, overall employment has held up, 
but employment in traditional manufacturing export sectors has been hurt badly.  This raises 
the question of providing government assistance to the worst hit sectors.  But this seems 
inappropriate, if the economy itself is still growing.  It is only to be expected that economic 
growth will be associated with some growing sectors and some declining sectors.  In an open 
economy, this process takes place partly through real exchange rate movements and changes 
in competitiveness.  If there is to be a case for assisting sectors in decline, we should be able 
to identify some failure of the market mechanism to facilitate the process of adjustment to 
changes in sectoral or regional growth rates.   
In fact, there is a large literature precisely on this question.  The discussion is usually 
focused on the phenomenon of high growth and real appreciation associated with resource or 
commodity booms.  The problem of macroeconomic adjustment to a resource boom has 
become known as the `Dutch Disease’.  The name comes from the Netherlands in the 1960’s, 
when North Sea oil discoveries led to the appreciation of the guilder, which hurt the 
traditional exporting industries.  Very similar episodes have been identified in the UK in the 
late 1970’s, and more recently in Norway.   
Does the Dutch Disease establish a case for government intervention?  Does it have 
implications for exchange rate policy?  This is a difficult question for traditional 
macroeconomics.  In the usual macroeconomic policy problem, there is a case for loosening 
monetary policy if the economy is in a recession – i.e. if output is below potential.  But in the 
case of a resource driven boom, driving up the real exchange rate, the economy as a whole 
may be at or above its potential.  So it is hard to make the case for a relaxation of monetary 
policy to prevent the exchange rate rising, since this would only exacerbate the boom.  Fiscal 
policy is a more useful instrument, if it is targeted at certain sectors being hit more directly by 
the real appreciation.  But if goods and factor markets are behaving efficiently, it is in general 
difficult to argue that governments should intervene to prevent the necessary adjustment of 
the real economy.  What circumstances would warrant such an intervention? One key 
consideration is that resource driven booms are likely to be a temporary phenomenon; the 
resource itself becomes depleted, or the increase in resource prices is reversed.  In this case, 
job losses in traditional export sectors may be costly if they lead to scrapped capital that must 
be replaced when the resource boom ends. A recent paper by Caballero and Lorenzoni (2007) 
analyzes the impact of real appreciations in such an environment.  They argue that, if the 
export sector is limited by financial constraints that lead to wasted capital, then there is a case 
for government subsidies.  The case for subsidies is tied to the phenomenon of overshooting.  
If export sectors shut down and capital is wasted, the initial real appreciation will be followed 
by an excessive real depreciation once the resource boom ends.  In this case, it is desirable for 
government to intervene both to limit the initial real appreciation and the subsequent real 
depreciation.  But this intervention is done via taxes and fiscal policy.  They do not explicitly 
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make the case for monetary policy intervention.  Whether monetary policy should be 
concerned with `Dutch disease’ affects is a difficult question.  We will discuss this in the next 
section, where we focus on Canada’s exchange rate policy.  
Exchange Rate Pass-through and Border Effects 
When there are large movements in exchange rates, the conventional economic model 
assumes that this will lead to adjustments in the costs of imported goods.  For instance, if the 
Canadian dollar strengthens relative to the US dollar, the textbook model predicts that this 
would reduce the price of goods imported from the US.  The degree to which movements in 
exchange rates are reflected in prices of goods is known as the `exchange rate pass-through’.  
After the sharp appreciation of the Canadian dollar in late 2007, it was apparent that pass-
through was far from perfect.  Prices of many consumer items from books to cars remained 
much more expensive in Canada relative to the US.  Because the rise in the Canadian dollar 
was so sudden and so large, after a long period of a weak dollar, this discrepancy in relative 
prices became quite widely recognized.  But in fact, the very slow degree of exchange rate 
pass-through into goods prices has long been recognized in the economics literature (Mussa 
1986).   Changes in exchange rates tend to cause almost equal changes in relative prices of 
goods, and these changes in relative prices tend to be very persistent.  This is just the micro 
version of the stylized fact we discussed in section 1 – where we noted that movements in the 
nominal and real exchange rates were very similar, except in the long run.  
To see the effect of slow exchange rate pass-through, take the following example.  Say we 
have four locations in North America, Vancouver, Los Angeles, Toronto, and Chicago.  In the 
era of globalization and free trade, we are accustomed to thinking of North America as being 
a highly integrated economy.  In particular, for locations that are relatively close to one 
another, like Los Angeles and Vancouver, or Toronto and Chicago, we might imagine that 
there is considerable trade, and we would anticipate trade to tend to equalize prices.  On the 
other hand, for locations that are further away, such as Vancouver and Toronto, or Los 
Angeles and Chicago, perhaps prices would not be so close to one another.  If North America 
were a seamless integrated economic union, then we should not expect that price comparisons 
between locations should be affected at all by the presence of the US-Canadian border.  
It turns out however, that when we compare prices across locations, the border matters a 
tremendous amount – it is in fact the most important determinant of relative prices.  This has 
been noted by Engel and Rogers (1996) and many other writers.  To see this, let us look at 
Figure 11.  There, we illustrate the movements in relative prices of city pairs during the 1990-
1997 period.  The pairs we focus on are Vancouver-Toronto, Toronto-Chicago, and Los 
Angeles-Chicago.  Again, if all that mattered in determining price differentials was distance, 
then we would anticipate that the Vancouver-Toronto or the Los Angeles-Chicago price 
would be more variable than the Toronto-Chicago price.  What do we see?  We see exactly 
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the opposite of this.  The relative price level in Vancouver to Toronto tends to move very 
little over this period, and the relative price of Los Angeles to Chicago tends to move very 
little.  But the relative price of Toronto-Chicago tends to move a lot.  In fact, the  price falls 
from 1998 onwards,  until 2002, and then rises quite suddenly.  So obviously the border 
makes a big difference in terms of relative price variability.  Why is this?  Well, the most 
obvious answer is the movement in the nominal exchange rate.  If we look at the final locus 
on the Figure – movement in the Canadian-US dollar, we see that the relative price of 
Toronto-Chicago tracks almost perfectly the movement in the nominal exchange rate.  
 
Figure 11:  Relative City Prices and the Exchange Rate, January 1998=1 
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Vancouver-Toronto LA-Chicago
Toronto-Chicago ER
 
    Source: BLS, Cansim 
 
 The data then suggest a very small degree of exchange rate pass-through.  Movements in 
the exchange rate tend to generate equal movements in relative prices, because the actual 
dollar prices of goods on either side of the border do not tend to move very much.  That is, 
over the course of this period, the price level in Toronto and Chicago was rising by about two 
percent per year, and didn’t adjust very much to the wide movements in the Canadian US 
dollar exchange rate.  The same conclusion may be drawn from the Vancouver and Los 
Angeles prices.  The reason the border matters is that the two markets on either side of the 
border are using different currencies, and the relative price of these currencies - the exchange 
rate, is changing substantially.  Exchange rate pass-through is limited – the evidence suggests 
that highly persistent movements in exchange rates tend to generate highly persistent 
movements in the relative prices of goods across borders.   
What is the reason for such limited pass-through?  This has been an area of intense 
research interest over the last decade.  On the one hand, it is fairly widely acknowledged that 
nominal prices are slow to adjust in response to macro shocks, and if prices are set in 
domestic currencies, then exchange rate movements will cause fluctuations in relative prices 
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across countries – even in goods that are traded.  But empirical evidence (e.g. Bils and 
Klenow 2005) suggests that nominal price stickiness is quite a transitory phenomenon; most 
firms adjust their prices within a year at most.  On the other hand, there is substantial 
evidence of persistence in real exchange rates and deviations from the law of one price 
(Rogoff 1997, Engel 1999).  How can this be reconciled with short term price stickiness?  A 
number of possibilities have been explored in the literature.  One explanation is that in fact, 
pass-through at the imported good level is high, but measured prices of consumer goods 
contain a substantial `non-traded’ component in the form of local distribution costs. Another 
complementary explanation is that foreign exporting firms are in competition with local firms 
for the local market in many products – when the exchange rate depreciates, it increases local 
currency costs for these exporters, but competitive pressures prevent them from passing these 
directly through to the local markets, and they are forced to adjust their markups. 
The full explanation of persistence in deviations in prices of traded goods across countries 
and the relationship between exchange rate fluctuations and such deviations promises to be a 
continuing area of interest.   
The Dollar and the External Wealth of Canada 
One little discussed effect of the stronger dollar is the effect on Canada’s financial portfolio.  
On the factors behind US dollar weaknesses, we noted the impact of exchange rates on the US 
portfolio.  Here we focus on the equivalent issue for Canada. Just as individuals and 
corporations have financial balance sheets that are separated into assets and liabilities, 
countries as a whole have external balance sheets.  In this external balance sheet, the asset 
category is defined as the sum of all financial claims of Canadian individuals, corporations 
and governments on the rest of the world.  For instance, this would include holdings of 
foreign corporate and government bonds, FDI holdings in the US, Europe, and elsewhere, as 
well as equity holdings in foreign country stock markets.  Much of these asset holdings might 
be held indirectly by Canadian banks or pension funds, rather than directly by individuals.  In 
the liability side of the external balance sheet, we would include foreign holdings of bonds 
issued by Canadian governments and corporations, FDI holdings in Canada, and holdings of 
Canadian stocks and shares held abroad.  The difference between (gross) assets and liabilities 
give Canada’s net foreign assets.  The largest component of Canada’s external assets is in 
direct investment abroad, while the largest component of its liabilities is in portfolio 
investment.  Both aggregates are very large – in 2006, total assets were 71 percent of GDP, 
while liabilities were 77 percent of GDP.  
In traditional balance of payments theory, we model the growth in net foreign assets as 
originating from trade or current account surpluses.  If a country is experiencing a trade 
surplus, it will be building up claims on the rest of the world, and its net foreign assets will be 
rising.  But when we acknowledge the portfolio structure of gross external assets and 
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liabilities, we find that net foreign assets can be changed by movements in exchange rates or 
interest rates, even without any changes in the trade balance.  That is, because gross assets 
and liabilities generally differ in their composition in terms of currency composition, maturity 
structure, and type of investment (e.g. bonds vs. stocks, etc), changes in exchange rates, 
interest rates, and security prices can actually change an economy’s net foreign assets.  Thus, 
an economy can experience fluctuations in its net wealth due to `valuation’ effects on its gross 
external portfolio.  
How important can these valuation effects be?  This depends critically on how large are 
gross external assets or liabilities, and their decomposition into different classes of assets.  For 
instance, if a country has very large, offsetting gross assets and liabilities, but they are 
denominated in different currencies, then an exchange rate change can have a big effect on net 
external wealth.  When we look at the recent data on capital flows, one striking fact is the 
phenomenal growth in gross external assets and liabilities.  In the last decade especially, gross 
holdings have risen dramatically in many large economies.  Some countries have gross 
external assets and liabilities that are multiples of GDP  (see Lane and Milesi Ferretti 2007).  
In this case exchange rate changes can be very important.  As we noted above, most US 
liabilities are denominated in dollars (e.g. US Treasury Bills), while most of its assets are 
denominated in non-dollar investments (e.g. FDI in Europe).  In this case, a depreciation of 
the US dollar increases the dollar value of its assets, while leaving its liabilities unchanged.   
In Canada, the breakdown of the gross assets and liabilities into currency composition is 
not officially reported.  But a recent paper by Lane and Shambaugh (2007) has constructed 
estimates of the currency position of external holdings for a large panel of countries, ending 
in 2004.  They estimate that for 2004, Canada’s gross assets are almost all held in foreign 
currencies, with about 60 percent denominated in US dollars, 14 percent euro, 10 percent in 
pounds sterling, and the rest in various other currencies.  On the other hand, Canada’s gross 
liabilities, according to their estimates, are much more concentrated in Canadian dollars.  In 
their estimate, 55 percent of gross liabilities are in Canadian dollars, 30 percent in US dollars, 
8 percent in euro, 3 percent in pounds sterling, and the rest in other currencies.  
Recognizing the asymmetry in the currency composition of assets and liabilities, it is clear 
that movements in Canada’s  exchange rate will have implications for net foreign assets.  In 
fact, because a lot of our liabilities are in Canadian dollars, but none of our assets are in 
dollars, an appreciation of the exchange rate will reduce Canadian net foreign wealth.  Using 
Lane and Shambaugh’s currency composition estimates for 2004, and assuming they apply 
equally to 2007, we can estimate impact of the Canadian dollar appreciation of 2007 on net 
foreign assets.   This requires knowledge of a) the gross asset and liability position – here we 
use the 2006 estimates discussed above, b) the currency compositions described above, and c) 
the changes in the exchange rate for 2007 – the Canadian dollar appreciated by 20 percent 
against the US dollar, 7 percent against the euro, 16 percent against the pound, but 
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depreciated by 12 percent against the yen.  
  Table 1 reports the estimates.  Note that this calculation is clearly imperfect, because 
asset prices themselves changed through the year so as to alter the estimates of assets and 
liabilities in ways that we are not accounting for here.  Nevertheless, the estimates give the 
pure valuation effect of exchange rate changes themselves, holding other factors constant.  
The Table indicates that the impact of the dollar appreciation in 2007 reduced  Canadian 
external net wealth by 108 billion dollars.  This is a large number–it is equivalent to about 7 
percent of Canadian GDP, or alternatively, $3,600 per capita. Interestingly, this portfolio 
impact of the dollar movement is larger than the estimates of any other channels by which the 
exchange rate appreciation  affected  the  Canadian  economy.   It  is  approximately  equal to 
three times the current account surplus of 2006.  It is ironic that, probably the largest single 
impact of the movement in the Canadian dollar in 2007 has gone entirely unreported in the 
media.  
  
Table 1 
 
of which: US Euro UK Yen Swiss
59 15 10 4.3 2
of which: US Euro UK Yen Swiss
30 8 3 2 1
US Euro UK Yen
0.2 0.07 0.16 -0.12
Gross Assets/GDP = 0.71
Gross Liabilities/GDP = 0.77
Exchange Rate Change 2007
 In Canadian Dollars 0.01%
 In foreign currencies 99.98%
 In Canadian Dollars 55%
 In foreign currencies 45%
 
 
Total Revaluation of Net Foreign Assets = Gross Assets/GDP*(Assets(2007)-Assets(2006))-
Gross Liabilities/GDP*(Liabilities(2007)-Liabilities(2006)) 
Source: Cansim, Author's calculations 
6  The Exchange Rate and Canadian Monetary Policy  
We have spent a lot of time discussing the movement of the exchange rate, the theory of real 
exchange rate determination, and the influence of the exchange rate on the economy.  But we 
have not really touched much on the role of the exchange rate in economic policy, and in 
particular, the way in which the exchange rate should affect monetary policy. For almost 
twenty years now, Canada’s monetary policy has been directed towards a policy of inflation 
targeting.  This means that the Bank of Canada uses monetary policy primarily to achieve a 
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desired target for the rate of inflation.  Currently, they target an inflation rate of 2 percent.  In 
practice, this means that the Bank uses its principal monetary policy lever – the short term 
interest rate – to influence the movement of inflation in the economy.  If the inflation rate 
tends to be above the target rate, the Bank increases the interest rate, while if the inflation rate 
is below the target, they reduce the interest rate.   
Since monetary policy has effectively only one instrument – the short term interest rate, a 
monetary policy that is used exclusively to target inflation cannot simultaneously be used to 
achieve a given value for the exchange rate.  This means that the Bank of Canada must 
effectively let the value of the exchange rate be determined freely in the foreign exchange 
market – Canada has a floating exchange rate system.  Almost all advanced economies now 
have a similar system – they do not try to target their exchange rate.  This was not always 
true.  In the immediate post-WWII period, as we discussed in section 2, many countries 
maintained a fixed value of their exchange rate against the US dollar.  And even today, some 
emerging market economies still intervene in order to prevent their exchange rates from 
moving – China is the classic example.  But a rather different example is the euro area.  
Before 1999, Europe had many separate currencies – the German d-mark, the French franc, 
the Italian Lira, for instance.  But these countries agreed to form a single currency area, 
whereby they would use only one currency – the euro, in all countries.  This is in effect a 
radical and permanent form of fixed exchange rate system.  Germany and France by definition 
now have a fixed exchange rate against one another, because they use the same currency.   
There is a long and extensive literature in economics on the merits of fixed versus floating 
exchange rates.  After the Second World War, most countries felt that a fixed exchange rate 
was a necessary requirement of economic stability, and as a result, they formed the Bretton 
Woods system, fixing against the dollar.  But in the last 40 years, the pendulum has swung 
decisively the other way.  Most countries now see the principal role of monetary policy as 
maintaining low and stable rates of inflation – in effect focusing on internal domestic 
macroeconomic objectives, and this is inconsistent with keeping the exchange rate fixed.   
In the previous discussion, we have touched on some of the arguments for a flexible 
exchange rate.  All economies are vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks from both internal 
and external sources – Canada for instance is exposed to movements in world oil prices, 
commodity prices, terms of trade, and US and other country’s business cycle fluctuations.  
The exchange rate can be an important part of the adjustment mechanism to these shocks.  For 
instance, during the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, there was a big fall in the demand for 
Canadian commodities, because many of the fast growing East Asian economies went into a 
deep recession.  The Canadian dollar fell quite sharply – generating a substantial real 
exchange rate depreciation, which helped to improve the trade balance and offset the negative 
effects of the shock on the economy.  In this sense, the exchange rate acts as a `shock 
absorber’, helping to cushion the real economy from the effects of shocks.  This type of 
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stabilizing mechanism could not occur with a fixed exchange rate.   A second and related 
argument for flexible exchange rates is the one we already touched on above.  If a Central 
Bank decides to peg its exchange rate to the currency of another currency, then it loses its 
independence to use monetary policy to guide the economy.  So, in response to a negative 
external shock, the Central Bank could not lower the interest rate to stabilize the economy.  It 
would have to give up its power to influence both the domestic inflation rate and the overall 
level of economic activity in the economy.  The only way that a country can achieve both an 
independent monetary policy and maintain a fixed value of its currency is if it restricts the 
free movement of financial capital into and out of the country.  This is the way that China 
currently maintains its fixed exchange rate.  But economists agree that free financial flows are 
a desirable part of the international economic system.  Hence, if countries are to have 
independence in monetary policy, then they must give up control of the exchange rate. 
What is the counter-argument for fixed exchange rates?  Why do some countries in Asia 
try to keep their exchange rates pegged?  One reason is that exchange rate volatility is 
perceived to be costly in itself.  As we have seen, real and nominal exchange rates are highly 
volatile, and seem to be only weakly related to economic fundamentals.  If we accept this, 
then it may be harder to make the case that the exchange rate is an efficient macroeconomic 
adjustment mechanism.  Excessive exchange rate volatility may discourage cross-border trade 
and investment, since firms may have difficulty in planning when future exchange rates are 
hard to predict.  In this view, the exchange rate may be more `part of the problem’ than `part 
of the solution’, in the sense that exchange rates may exhibit large swings as a result of 
speculative behaviour in financial markets that has little relationship to current 
macroeconomic fundamentals.  As a result, there may be a case for redirecting monetary 
policy so as to target the exchange rate, at least partially. In fact, the monetary policy decision 
is not quite `black and white’, whereby you can either focus on targeting domestic inflation, 
or targeting the exchange rate, but not both.  It is possible to have an intermediate target for 
the domestic inflation rate, but to adjust monetary policy so as to counter big short term 
swings in the exchange rate.  
If exchange rates tend to overshoot on the way up or down, it may be that monetary policy 
could be used to prevent this, without giving up on the long run objective of price stability.  
Devereux and Engel (2009) argue that expectations can be a large determinant of exchange 
rate swings, and even if these expectations are determined by rational predictions of future 
fundamentals, there may be a case for monetary policy to partially target exchange rate 
fluctuations.  Whether this applies to Canadian monetary policy however is an open question.  
We have argued above that commodity and oil prices seem to be an important underlying 
fundamental driver of the Canadian real exchange rate.  In this case, we may argue that 
movements in the exchange rate are efficient and do not require any compensating action 
from the Bank of Canada.  On the other hand, even if the exchange rate responds in the right 
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direction, expectations driven capital flows could lead it to fluctuate too much in response to 
the underlying fundamentals.  The Bank of Canada’s exchange rate model does seem to track 
the actual exchange rate using commodity prices and interest rates as explanatory variables, 
but there is some overshooting and undershooting according to the model, and even without 
this, it does not establish that the movement of the exchange rate is fully efficient.  
The belief that exchange rate fluctuations are inimical to trade and investment flows in an 
integrated single market was central to the case for setting up the European single currency.  
Some economists have argued that a similar set of arguments can be applied to Canada 
relationship with the US.   They argue that a single North American currency would help to 
integrate Canada into the US market, and prevent the wide swings in real exchange rates that 
have been a characteristic of the Canadian dollar for the last 15 years. Practically speaking, 
this would require Canada to adopt the US dollar, since it would be naïve to imagine that the 
US would give up its own currency so as to enter into a cooperative currency arrangement 
with Canada.  
Would Canada gain from adopting the US dollar?  To answer this, we have to consider 
what is the optimal size of a currency area for North America.  The Optimal Currency Area 
criteria are based on looking at differences in economic shocks among regions, and the ease 
with which factors of production may move between regions.  If two regions are mostly 
subject to common economic shocks, then there is little need for exchange rate adjustment 
between the regions, and also the stance of monetary policy should be quite similar in the two 
regions.  In this case, the regions should consider using the same currency, since adopting a 
common currency brings microeconomic benefits in the form of reducing trade costs and 
uncertainty between the regions.  Even if the regions have differences in shocks, but labour 
and capital may easily move across regions, then these factor flows act so as to stabilize 
economic activity between the regions, and they may use a common currency.   
Is Canada in an optimal currency area with the US?  Most evidence suggests that the 
answer is no.  The Canadian business cycle is similar to that of the US, but the two countries 
have quite different economic structures, which means that even the same shock, such as a 
rise in oil prices, have quite different impacts on the two economies.  Figure 12 illustrates the 
movement of Canadian and US GDP growth over the last twenty years.  It is apparent that 
while the two economies move together on average, there have been times when they 
diverged sharply.  This suggests that they do not at the moment form an optimal currency 
area.  
 Interestingly, however, the same type of measures for Europe before the inception of the 
euro area suggested that the European Economies did not form an optimal currency area 
either. Nevertheless they formed the euro area.  The record so far with the euro area suggests 
that these economies have not suffered from greater regional economic instability by not 
having an independent exchange rate to adjust to regional shocks.  
DEVEREUX     Much Appreciated? The Rise of the Canadian Dollar 
 
 31
 
       Figure 12:  Comovement of Growth Rates: US-Canada 
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 Some economists have suggested that the formation of a currency area may actually lay the 
foundation for endogenous economic integration, thereby reducing the costs of giving up on 
the exchange rate as an adjustment device.  Indeed, a related argument applies to Canada 
itself.  The shocks hitting Eastern, Central, and Western Canada have rarely been fully 
synchronized.   
  
Figure 13:  Comovement of Growth Rates: Eastern and Western Canada 
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 Figure 13 shows the size-weighted growth rates of Eastern Canada (Quebec and Ontario), 
compared with Western Canada (BC Alberta and Saskatchewan).  As we see, although there 
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is clearly a common Canadian business cycle, in many historical instances, growth rates have 
been high in Ontario and Quebec, but low or negative in the West, and vice versa.   In fact, it 
could be argued that there is at least as much common co-movement between the US and 
Canada as between Eastern Canada and Western Canada! Based on the standard optimal 
currency area criteria, this might suggest that Canada itself is not an optimal currency area.  
But few  economists would suggest that Canada needs two central banks and two currencies.  
On the whole, the whole country performs very well with a single currency.  This suggests 
that the simple application of optimal currency area criteria are not always relevant.  Thus, it 
is not infeasible that at some time in the future there will be greater consensus for some type 
of North American single currency arrangement.  Until then however, we will have to deal 
with our dollar ourselves. 
7  Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the recent trend in the Canadian dollar using the backdrop of the 
academic literature on theoretical and empirical models of exchange rates.  From the 
perspective of theory and empirical evidence, we have argued there are solid underlying 
reasons for the remarkable real exchange rate appreciation that the Canadian dollar has 
experienced against the US dollar over the past 5 years.  Despite this, it would be naïve to 
conclude that foreign exchange markets always operate efficiently, and that the value of the 
dollar always accurately reflects underlying economic fundamentals.  As regards the 
implications for monetary policy however, it is hard to make a case that a more aggressive 
monetary rule that targeted the nominal exchange rate would have improved Canada’s macro 
performance over the last decade.  
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